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Godfrey Baldacchino
AUTONOMOUS BUT NOT SOVEREIGN?: 
 A REVIEW OF ISLAND SUB-NATIONALISM*
1. The Setting  This paper hypothesizes that small islands provide a number of lessons in the
political economy of development, particularly in the manner in which they enjoy and deploy sub-
national jurisdictional leverage. A range of examples illustrates how a number of small island
jurisdictions navigate “autonomy”: that is, what at face value appears to be the “limbo” between
sovereignty and dependency, in practice may turn out to be a winning strategy in political economy.
A distinction is also made between, on one hand, the utilization or rendering of autonomy as merely
a lever for the extraction of larger fiscal transfers or “rents” from benevolent sponsors,  and, on the1
other hand, as a driver for increased constitutional discretion, while notionally remaining a sub-
national jurisdiction.  The concept of sub-nationalism explains the particular combinations of “shared2
rule” and “self rule” that these small territories have secured in the contemporary political scene. In
considering the “creative politics” of small islands, special attention is given to the five main policy
dimensions of their articulation: natural resource management, fiscal policy, freedom of movement
of people, air/sea transportation policy, and para-diplomacy.
2. A Failed Prognosis  In 1987, political scientist Paul Sutton confidently predicted that ten
erstwhile non-sovereign territories--Aruba, French Polynesia, Greenland, Montserrat, Namibia, New
Caledonia/Kanaky, Western Sahara, and parts of the Trust Territory of the Pacific (Palau, Marshall
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia)--would be seeking and achieving political independence over
the following five years.3
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The year 1992 has come and gone. With the advantage of hindsight, it can now be said that Dr.
Sutton’s prognosis proved to be substantially wrong.  From his list, only Namibia sought and4
obtained independence, in 1990. The three Trust Territories of the Pacific, while legally sovereign,
operate within a “Compact of Free Association” with the USA, which grants the latter defense rights
and obligations.  Of the rest, only Western Sahara appears to be still heading slowly along the5
independence route. Another new sovereign state, Eritrea, was not on his list, nor were all the
offspring of the break-up of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. All the other
candidates on the Sutton list did not obtain full sovereignty--not so much because independence was
denied to them, but rather, in most cases, because they have not requested it in the first place.
Referenda in the Dutch Antilles (1993 and 1994), Puerto Rico (1993), U.S. Virgin Islands (1993),
and Bermuda (1993) have all rejected independence by huge margins.  The August 1998 vote in6
Nevis was exceptional in that it was approved by almost 62% of the voters, although still falling
short of the required two-thirds majority.  It is also curious to note that, of the ten territories on the7
Sutton list, only the non-insular territories have, or are, contemplating orthodox independence (that
is, Namibia and Western Sahara). Could it be sheer coincidence that Eritrea is also not an island?
There hardly appears to be any sentiment for independence among non-sovereign island
territories today. Over the last two decades, the only small country (actually a half-island) to struggle
and obtain independence in May 2002, was East Timor. Meanwhile, there are a number of peoples
waiting in the proverbial wings to declare their statehood, but only one of these is an island.  The9 10
only island with a strong pro-independence movement up till the 1990s has been New
Caledonia/Kanaky;  to which, today, one may add Corsica, although Corsican separatism is not11
necessarily independence-driven.
A dominant trend in world politics over recent decades has been for countries to grow smaller
rather than larger, by fracturing along national and ethnic lines. Will this trend continue any longer?
This drive seems to have stopped short of its assumed natural conclusion, that is, sovereignty,
certainly for islands.
The contemporary political map is strewn with cases of island jurisdictions. Watts identifies
“forms of political relations which combine autonomy [read self-rule] and partnership [read shared-
rule]” within federal political systems.  These include the following five categories,  each of which12 13
incorporates contemporary island exponents:
· Constitutionally centralized unions14
· Constitutionally decentralized unions15
· Federations16
· Federacies (mainly ex-colonial associations)--dissolvable by mutual consent17
· Associated states--dissolvable unilaterally18
McElroy and Mahoney explain how political affiliation continues to grant substantial economic
advantages to small, non-sovereign, island units. These benefits include free trade with (and export
preference from) the parent country, social welfare assistance, ready access to external capital
through special tax concessions, availability of external labour markets through migration, aid-
financed infrastructure and communications, higher quality health and educational systems, natural
disaster relief, and provision of external defense cost. Autonomy without sovereignty also does not
hinder the development of flourishing tourism economies, and may actually facilitate them because
of easier terms of access and security. Most of these special conditions have emerged in the context
of a history of a relatively benign colonial relationship--typically one dominated by strategic rather
than economically exploitative interests.19
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A second explanation for the lack of a drive for independence is the existence of an ample dose
of existing jurisdictional prerogative. Many small islands, because they are islands, enjoy some
degree of administrative autonomy. This same feature supported the transition of some two dozen
small islands or achipelagos to sovereign statehood, starting with Iceland, in the period of 1944-1984.
Furthermore, because they are also small and somewhat isolated, and irrespective of independence,
such island jurisdictions usually manage to extract some special advantages from their respective
metropole. Those that have refrained from sovereignty, jurisdictionally, or constitution-ally, enjoy
more discretionary powers than any similarly sized or even larger blocs of the “mainland.”  Royle20
identifies 41 populated territories with overseas territories, associated status, compacts of free
association, or some other special, separate arrangement with a larger state. Four of these are fully-
fledged departments of France.  Fagerlund describes the four autonomous European island regions21
enjoying a special relationship, this time with that sort-of-supranational state, the European Union.22
It appears that the independence candle for islands has been snuffed, at least for the moment. The
current status is regarded as the best of both worlds. These island jurisdictions wield many of the
benefits associated with political sovereignty while they are delegating responsibilities to, enjoying
the security and reaping the material benefits of, remaining in association with a larger, and typically
richer, patron.
Thirdly, and related to the above topic, one must address a twist in the contemporary
articulation of nationalism. National identity is and remains one of the most powerful forces in
modern history, and at the root of much civil strife and violence. However, sovereignty and self-
determination do not appear to be any longer the obvious trajectories of peoples who see themselves
as dispossessed political entities or at the losing end of federalist developments.  The articulation23
of nationalism is becoming jurisdictional but not necessarily sovereigntist.
The summative analysis of the above dynamics suggests that many island people are
comfortable in displaying evidences of sub-nationalism, much like a regional or geographically
anchored ethnicity. Typically, there is a morbid interest in outright independence, a lukewarm but
deep-seated sympathy in favour of maintaining links with former colonial patron states, and a sense
of pride and identity with their island jurisdiction in the context of having a more powerful but arms-
length protector. The intermittent willingness to interpret or test the “shared-rule versus self-rule”
formula constitutes the hard core of local politics. The key ideological schism is not in terms of left
versus right, but in terms of autonomism/secessionism versus integrationism/irredentism. The
electorate will judge local political leaders mainly on their ability to work and negotiate the balance
of power with the larger player in the political dyad. In short: Parva Sub Ingenti.24
3. Three Routes to Autonomy  Colonialism has been the main explanatory variable underlying
small-island autonomy and small-state sovereignty. As colonization retreated after 1945, it left in
its wake small puddles of jurisdiction, with the largest territories obtaining sovereignty first, with
the smallest territories following last, but with the really very smallest units stubbornly refusing to
budge. See Table 1.
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Table 1: The Largest Go First: The Direct Relationship between Population Size and
Achievement of Independence: (1943-1987)
5-Year No. of Countries Total Average Population per
Epoch Securing Independence Populations Newly Independent
During this Time (Thousands) Country
1943-1947 9 1379823 153313000
1948-1952 8 339423 42427000
1953-1957 6 136411 22735000
1958-1962 28 421323 15047000
1963-1967 12 100771 8397000
1968-1972 10 146261 14626100
1973-1977 13 37495 2884000
1978-1982 9 14001 1556000
1983-1987 4 561 140000
Populated, 42 (38 of 17168 408700
Autonomous but which are
Non-Sovereign Islands)
Territories
Same, but excluding 38 (36 of 3183 83760
Puerto Rico, Macao, which are
Hong Kong and West Islands)
Bank
Source: CIA, The World Fact Book 2003 (Washington: Brasseys, Inc. for the Central Intelligence
Agency, 2002).
Insularity, isolation, and small size provide the geographical, if not also administrative, logistic,
cultural and historical, properties to render the existence of such jurisdictional pockets, whether
sovereign or merely autonomous, much more likely.
Conversely expressed, unless a territory has enjoyed separate status within a colonial
relationship, it appears most unlikely to have the basic political raw material which eventually could
be nurtured into being a sovereign state, or even a quasi-sovereign one. This situation would have
resulted because the administrative boundaries legitimating a distinct political identity were
developed both out of sheer convenience as well as within the comfort of an internationally and
domestically recognized framework of colonial rule. 
Native Peoples have also been quite successful in securing decision-making powers from the
metropole in recent years--all the more so when they are islanders. This goes for the Aleutian
Islanders (Alaska, USA); the Baffin/Ellesmere Islanders (Canada) and the Torres Strait Islanders
(Australia). Small population base size here is also likely to facilitate the granting of “autonomy.”
In the case of continental states which have island provinces or regions without a history of a
given, separate colonial boundary, the metropole is usually careful not to create the circumstances
for any eventual devolution, unless exceptionally obliged to do so under force majeure: witness
recent overtures to Corsica by the centralized French state, in the wake of violence and strong moves
for separatism. Such a strategy could be undertaken, for example, by deliberately avoiding the
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creation of exclusively island-based administrative or political units, ensuring that geographic “island
regions” are incorporated within larger sub-national units,  or are themselves broken down into25
smaller, sub-national units, as occurs in large archipelagic states such as the Philippines and
Indonesia. Opportunism may create historical conjunctures which facilitate such a withdrawal of
autonomy, and the availability of prized resources may provide the material pretext to do so.26
Meanwhile, failing the colonial card, island regions must rely on diplomatic acumen and
leadership to extract discretionary powers from the central state. How is this done? One way of so
doing is to use the existence of a supranational institution to somehow circumvent the local state.
This is one intended outcome of the islands’ lobby within the European Union, which has identified
no less than 286 island regions as the targets of “specific measures” since the adoption of the Treaty
of Amsterdam.  The sheer act of being defined and recognized as an “island region” could, in itself,27
be seen to represent an, albeit tokenistic, political victory of sorts. Of course, one could argue that
such initiatives actually conspire to consolidate rather than erode the dependency of such island
regions, and that a high political price could eventually be paid in exchange for any transfer of funds
from Brussels resulting from such a recognition.
A more radical way is to embark unilaterally on a style of “rogue politics” which may set an
island region on a confrontational path with a central government but where critical local public
opinion may be swayed in favour of the lurch and thereby act to legitimate it democratically, if not
legally or constitutionally. Whether such politics may indeed be deemed “maverick” is probably a
matter of interpretation. Fully sovereign island regions may be more likely to adopt such a system
and could therefore rely on the momentum or “extantism” that sovereignty provides, in their
confrontation with other, larger powers.  Examples which come to mind include Iceland and the28
“cod wars” with Great Britain in the mid-twentieth century, Malta’s negotiations with the UK over
the military facilities on the island in the 1970s, and the drive by Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands
for a nuclear-free Pacific in the 1980s.29
In all three routes identified above, smallness of population and/or land area, isolation, and
islandness can act in concert to fuel a distinctive politics and act to safeguard and differentiate the
region from external “intervention.”  Rather than consider such departures as exceptional, it would30
be wiser to see them as examples of carving out political niches where geography facilitates the
action, while at the same time it circumscribes the territorial scope of any achieved/granted powers
and privileges.
Handsome benefits result from the extraction and deployment of jurisdictional power.  They31
usually translate into a larger localization of control over economic and political decisions. The apex
of jurisdictional powers, which are far greater in relation to the small size of a land mass or resident
population, has been achieved and assiduously cultivated especially by sovereign small states--
fisheries policy by Iceland, the only successful exclusive enterprise zone in Africa by Mauritius,
sustainable tourism policy by the Seychelles, and air transportation policy by Malta. But the
political economy of success is perhaps even clearer among non-sovereign island territories.
4. Five Capacities  Island-based and island-biased literature suggests five policy categories which
have been most likely to fit within the remission of self-rule. They are scrutinized by sub-national
island authorities/spokespersons as policy concerns which they would rather have under local
control, in order to be undisputed actors in shaping economic prosperity.  Contestation over “who32
does what” in these policy areas also has been typically tense and may in itself trigger demands for
more self-rule and autonomy, or its withdrawal or its renegotiation in some other way between the
parties concerned.
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4 a) Powers over Finance, Mainly Banking, Insurance, and Taxation:  Most offshore finance centres
are located on small island territories, because the latter habitually involve few significant domestic
transactions, attract “rent”-based surpluses from elsewhere, and are therefore not unduly troubled
by low tax policies. Arguably, locating offshore finance centres on small non-sovereign islands helps
to place the industry more closely within the purview of government approval and thereby increase
investor confidence.  Smallness and insularity may precipitate a “capture of the local state” by33
international financial capital, such as international banks and large accountancy firms as well as not-
so-respectable operators.  The Group of Seven’s published blacklist of fifteen territories where34
money laundering was allegedly taking place included ten island locations.  Successful finance35
centres located in small economies also tend to “crowd out” pre-existing industries, such as
agriculture or small-scale manufacturing, which increases the price of property and skilled labour.
Such a condition prevails in such island territories as the Channel Islands  and Madeira.36 37
Baldacchino and Milne consider the power to tax as the most critical capacity to economic
prosperity.  An exceedingly low tax environment, induced by low corporation taxes and business38
rates, generous capital allowances, absence of capital gains tax, wealth tax, capital transfer tax,
inheritance tax, death or estate duties, along with low personal income tax rates ranging between 15-
20%, goes a long way towards attracting manufacturing and service industries.  Such a clutch of39
fiscal powers largely forms the basis of the success of the Isle of Man.  Locating international40
offshore finance centres, banks, and insurance companies situated on low/no-tax islands as enclaves
of larger states enables the reaping of the benefits of the industry while limiting the associated costs.
4 b) Powers over Environmental Policy, Particularly Natural Resources:  The management of
specific local resources desired by the central state, such as oil, gas, mineral deposits, fishing zones,
strategic bases, tourism potential, or sheer political loyalty, can, and has been, used as a leverage for
extracting some degree of policy autonomy.  The Canadian Provinces of Newfoundland and41
Labrador and British Columbia, as well as the Shetland Islands in the UK, have successfully
negotiated some local powers from the central state over critical dimensions of their economy, largely
in relation to jurisdiction over oil, gas, and other sub-soil resources.  The same cannot be said about42
the management of the Newfoundland fishing stocks.  North Sea oil and gas has also led to some43
renegotiation of the power balance between Faroe Islands and Denmark  and between the Shetland44
Islands and the UK.  Svalbard (Spitzbergen) is a special case with its bilateral treaty provisions over45
mining access reached between Norway and the USSR/Russia.  Sakhalin Island, with its prized oil46
resources, has its own governor, yet it is not a Russian federal district. Other islands have extended
their economic zones over tracts of sea many times larger than their own land mass, notably the
Falklands. Yet other islands, such as Hainan (China) or Batam (Indonesia), have benefitted
economically by being designated as special economic zones.  Such changes have not been47
accompanied by a measure of power transfer.
Meanwhile, the contribution of islands to cultural, environmental, and biological diversity is
proportionately much greater than the size of their territories or populations.  Sixteen sites from48
thirteen different island regions in Europe have been added by UNESCO to its World Heritage list.49
Islands which in toto are also World Heritage Sites, such as Rapa Nui or Galapagos, are governed
differently from the “normal,” mainland provinces of Chile and Ecuador, respectively.
4 c) Powers over Access, Particularly in Relation to Air and Sea Transportation:  Transportation is
often a triple problem of choice, time, and price for islanders. Generally speaking, islanders know
that transportation options decrease and verge towards monopoly provision. Transit times increase
and prices rise with growing distances from mainland areas, and with decreasing size of a specific
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island’s population.  Archipelagic islands compound these issues even further.  Difficulties with50 51
transportation affect a whole range of issues, including the viability of a tourism industry, a
manufacturing export strategy, absence of economies of scale, as well as limitations to emergency
off-island health care.  Distance means high cost for the transport of goods, services and people, and52
effectively reduces access to the metropole, even for those overseas areas where residents are citizens
of a European mother country.  An analysis of the population history of the Irish Islands suggests53
a clear relationship between levels of access and population decline.  Island transportation is often54
in the hands of “governments,”  but which ones, and at which level, in a federal arrangement? The55
Åland Islands’ control over its shipping registry and the safeguarding of duty-free transactions on
Åland ships flying the Åland flag have been crucial to the territory’s economic prosperity.  In56
contrast, Niue’s dependence on a weekly Air Nauru service has led to a below-capacity operation
for its fledgling tourism industry when that service was discontinued for over 2 years.57
4 d) Powers over Free Movement of Persons:  Sub-national island jurisdictions usually comprise
small populations and a small land area. Given that smallness increases the disposition towards all-
round volatility,  the threats of depopulation or overpopulation loom larger, as do the resulting58
impacts on labour supply and demand, on housing stock surplus or shortages. Archipelagic island
territories must also contend with the additional dynamics of internal migration and urbanization.
Acute emigration, and more infrequently immigration, are the safety valves readily available in
response to all-too-frequent demographic, real estate, or employment imbalances. “Overall, it must
simply be concluded that the problems of human resource planning are particularly acute in island
micro-states.”  Pitcairn is the extreme scenario of an island risking depopulation.59 60
Many small islanders from sub-national jurisdictions look upon citizenship rights as a double
privilege. It is a condition which grants the basis for property ownership and employment on their
own island, to the possible exclusion of foreigners or even of other citizens of the same metropolitan
power,  while providing them with a passport for potential emigration and freedom of access to the61
territory and labour markets of the same metropolitan power. Since 1999, the citizens of the UK’s
overseas territories have enjoyed free access to the UK, a right hitherto extended only to the citizens
of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. The citizens of Puerto Rico and the Marshall Islands enjoy free
access to the USA. Lisbon granted citizenship rights in Portugal to almost all citizens of Macau
before the transfer of that territory to China in 1999. Island autonomies with a special association
with New Zealand, such as the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, have had half of their island-born
population living in New Zealand by the mid-1980s.  Indeed, “unconstrained migration” to a mother62
country, typically the former colonial power, is one key benefit of negotiating self-determination
without independence for small island territories.63
Concurrently, other island populations have swollen with the influx of foreigners. In the
Balearics, a 90% population increase in recent years has been due to immigration for the purpose of
retirement or employment.  Temporary residents, such as tourists, increase competition for local,64
scarce resources. Many small islands receive annual visitor numbers which are many times the size
of the local population.  The influx of temporary or permanent visitors raises the price of housing,65
at times beyond the reach of local islanders, causing political ripples.
4 e) Para-Diplomacy:  The devolution of representative power to institutions above or below the
nation state has assumed some momentum in recent years. Notable among these is the increasing
demand for political power by cities and large urban metropoles in a burgeoning knowledge economy.
In Europe, the Committee of the Regions within the EU is one such legitimate advisory body. “Para-
diplomacy” has involved sub-national governments establishing offices in Brussels or in other cities,
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within and outside the EU. A component of such devolution finds expression in the flurry of
international activity by sub-national “authorities.” The Catalan government within Spain has been
a recent striking example. Part of a wider process of recent and ongoing transformation of the EU into
a structure of multi-level governance involves defying those who, within a sovereigntist mould, had
only been able to imagine that the future would create a Europe of nation-states or a new country
called Europe. Another example is the Canadian Province of Québec, an active non-sovereign state
member of the Francophonie. The Riau Islands form the plank of a Singaporean-Indonesian
collaborative effort to kickstart development projects by creating jurisdictional enclaves, and bolder
than the exclusive economic zones of earlier development strategies.  “De facto states” in the66
international system, such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or the Tamil-controlled parts
of Sri Lanka (Tamil Eilam), press for recognition on the international stage, seeking to bypass other
regimes.  Other proponents of para-diplomacy include Tatarstan in Russia,  the German Länder67 68
and the Belgian region of Flanders.  In the world of island jurisdictions, para-diplomacy is one of69
the advantages of autonomy without sovereignty.
5. Discussion   We are dealing here with a cocktail of strategies that impact on the relationship
between the smaller island and larger metropolitan player. The island does not neglect its potential
resort to the metropole, whenever dire straits so determine or suggest, such as when the island
undergoes budgetary shortfalls, suffers environmental disasters, over-population, as well as labour
surpluses or shortages.  In this way, it avoids the chronic vulnerability which is supposed to plague70
small island territories most of all.  Meanwhile, the metropole not only fails to cut the island off71
this umbilical cord, but also fails to bring the island in step with respect to a common legislative or
regulatory regime. Such (in)action may also be deliberate, despite public declarations to the contrary.
The equilibrium resulting from this condition develops its own regulatory legitimacy and momentum.
A critical question to ask is whether such departures from the norm are in fact indicators of
autonomy, or merely manipulations driven and controlled by the central state to its own net
advantage, often without any consultation or power-sharing arrangements with the island locals.72
Non-sovereignty and sub-nationalism, therefore, can be a shrewd manner for a metropole of
hedging its risks, deploying a flexible and creative diplomacy, adopting free riding in such matters
as international relations, defense and security as well as currency issues, and/or slipping freely
through the nets of regulation. All these measures constitute a skills repertoire that the small and
powerless deploy and, being small, often get away with. They may also be providing useful
regulatory escape routes for their metropolitan patrons. Furthermore, the deployment of such skills
could command media attention and attract sympathy. Such is the character of unequal dyads: the
“tyranny of the weak.”73
What may be in store over the next few decades is not so much a flurry of independentist
movements, but attempts by sub-national jurisdictions to carve out policy discretion on a specific
number of areas in their favour. With nationalism losing its flavour and fashion, demands for sub-
nationalism are likely to increase. As the nation-state, a mythical construction of modernity, finds
itself too big as well as too small to address key political problems in the contemporary
“fragmegrative” space,  the pressures for internal devolution and internal federalism will increase,74
just as the incentive for supranational agreements with other neighbouring states will also. It is likely
that, as in the case of Malta and Mauritius forty years ago, political sovereignty as a fully-fledged
state will only be seriously entertained, or threatened, with some degree of bluff, if what is
considered a better deal by the smaller player is absolutely unacceptable to the larger.  The same75
political contest is bound to occur at a supranational and regional level, as countries jockey to
maintain policy autonomy while recognizing that “pooled sovereignty” is the only way forward to
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render such bodies as the European Union even more effective. The EU exists in the first place as
the outcome of such a sober assessment. “Government,” meaning decision-making by elected
representatives, gives way irrevocably to “governance,” meaning decision-making by networking
partnerships.76
A second observation concerns the financial dimensions of development. Conventional
economic statistics rank countries according to gross national/domestic product or purchasing power
parity standards. Wealth is often defined in such terms as per capita GNP/GDP. Often small island
territories are doing exceptionally well on these counts. In their powerful critique of the alleged
structural vulnerability of many small, often island, territories, Armstrong and Read conclude that
smaller jurisdictions actually perform economically better than larger states.  Of the ten richest77
countries in the world in terms of per capita GDP, only the USA has a population of more than
seven million, and six of these countries have a population of less than one million.  These include78
four island territories: Aruba, Iceland, Bermuda, and French Polynesia.  That three of the above four79
territories are non-sovereign states is also insightful. Comparative research has shown that, on the
average, non-sovereign island territories tend to be richer per capita than sovereign ones.  Stopping80
short of full independence, while negotiating access to spoils within a larger jurisdictional framework,
appears to pay off, literally. 
6. Creative Political Economy  McElroy and Mahoney conclude that small dependent (read sub-
national) island territories “...remain unwilling to trade the visible security, affluence and standard
of living of affiliation for the less tangible but more costly rewards of autonomy”.  Similarly,81
Bertram writes:
During the second half of the twentieth century … it would appear that small island
territories experienced a trade-off between sovereign nationhood and material welfare.
Whatever the rhetoric at the time, independence did not pay as well as continued political
dependence. In the new century the attributes of sovereignty, such as votes at the United
Nations and possession of internet domains, may turn out to confer greater bargaining
power than hitherto; but there is no clear incentive for presently-dependent island
territories to seek independence, and good grounds for them to hold to the status quo.82
While these observations highlight the pragmatic, often financial, basis for such a political
stance, it underestimates the economic leverage that autonomy could grant, apart from other non-
monetary, “status goods” such as identity, pride, international clout, and self-respect. However,
autonomy is not to be necessarily translated as sovereignty. Human nature is disorderly and
complex. It is also possible to encounter a scenario with opposite “cause-effect” dynamics--meaning
that an enhanced economic prowess and business success in/by a peripheral island can nurture such
sociocultural conditions which eventually lead to demands for greater autonomy.83
Armstrong and Read have argued that many very small states, most of which are island or
archipelagic territories, have managed to compensate effectively for their small size by a high quality
of “endogenous policy formulation and implementation.”  They also contend that “further84
investigation of the policy stance of successful micro-states, particularly in the sphere of
international political economy, is likely to be fruitful.”  This paper suggests an extension to this85
insightful observation, coming as it does from two eminent economists working largely in a neo-
classical and a-political mould, to sub-national considerations. International political economy
becomes domestic politics in the case of sub-national units, and falls within federalist studies where
sub-national jurisdictions exist constitutionally or legally.
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7. Conclusion  Like the proverbial miner’s canary, islands have been leading the way as frontline
zones and pioneers in a number of policy fields. These include the devolution or extraction of
specific policy autonomy from “core” powers, often in the context of deals which are mutually
advantageous, and often, but not necessarily, within federalist arrangements. The desirable option
today appears to be that of achieving some jurisdictional autonomy for territories which lack it, but
not to proceed to full sovereignty, as if that were some kind of natural course to be followed.
The nurturing and flexing of jurisdictional muscle, de jure or de facto, are bound to be a basic
feature of an increasingly integrated world. It may appear contradictory, even paradoxical, that such
machinations will be entertained and deployed in the face of rampant globalization and the ever
increasing interconnectedness of people and places. This observation, however, should not come as
a surprise to anyone except those who consider globalization as a deterministic, unidimensional
feature. Almost a century ago, Max Weber had advised that Economy and Society need not follow
the same laws of motion. Opportunities for maximizing welfare and development may be struck via
convergent liberalization on the economic front, where free trade is deemed beneficial, and via striking
political deals where free trade is not one’s best perceived option.  The world’s major powers86
provide various examples of protectionism in support of narrow but powerful local constituencies.
This paper is designed to alert readers of similar “convergent/divergent” antics at the other end of the
size continuum, reflecting examples of the sheer “power of powerlessness.”
The increasing and unstoppable interconnectedness of the world facilitates the understanding
of (themselves globalizing) markets. In so doing it spurs the resort to techniques which may distort
the market to one’s advantage. Politics is the instrument with which to exploit economics. A
federalization project as proposed in this paper is one such powerful political response to economic
opportunities. Sub-nationalism supports, and in turn facilitates, the multilayered loyalties that make
such a strategy politically possible and democratically popular.
Small islands are prototype peripheral regions which can be singled out as sites for “innovative
treatment” within the new political economy of development. Historically, they were already seen
as suitable locations for such pioneering initiatives as fortress or plantation economics.  Today, they87
may be looked upon as political innovators, testing out the limits of possibility which insularity,
small size, location, and a measure of administrative autonomy may offer.
Sovereignty gives way to autonomy, government gives way to governance, big gives way to
small--interesting dynamics in the context of globalization which, at face value, suggests the exact
opposite. Along with Drucker, we must come to terms with what is more than the “intriguing
coincidence” of an integrating global economy and a splintering global and national polity.88
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